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Policy Failure in Achieving Universal Basic Education: 
A Theoretical Analysis 
 




Universal attainment of basic education is recognised as a key development goal; 
whereas early-age work is considered as a barrier to achieving this goal. The literature suggests 
that returns to education are larger than those of early-age work, and that child-labour results in 
long term social loss that reduces human capital.  This study evaluates the argument that early-
age work can itself lead to accumulation of human capital when it takes the form of 
apprenticeship career path. The paper develops a model that allows a rational agent (parent) to 
compare the early-age work as apprenticeship career path with the formal education career and 
shows that the parents’ career choice for their child will depend on the lifetime earnings of 
both careers. The theoretical model is further extended and empirically tested to check whether 
benefits of education are higher for all levels of education. The simulation analysis suggests 
that for lower level of education up to Grade-12, the benefits of apprenticeship exceed the net 
benefits of education whereas, at Grade-12 and beyond, the net benefits of education in terms 
of earnings outstrip the apprenticeship career. The study implies that early-age work may not 
necessarily be inefficient when compared with low levels of schooling and that any 
intervention should ensure universal education for all without compromising skill development 
of resource poor children. This can be achieved through making skill development 
complementary to education.  
JEL Classifications:  H44, H52, I26, J24 
Keywords:  Child-labour, Basic Education, Human Capital, Public Policy 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The prevalence of early age work in less developed countries is generally 
attributed to mass poverty. In this backdrop, the policy either incentivises parents by 
offering conditional cash transfers to ensure that they send children to school, or takes 
coercive action to control child-labour. The economic theory views child-labour as a 
source of inefficiency because returns to education are large and early-age work results in 
reduced stock of human capital thus lowering lifetime earnings of the child [Basu and 
Van (1998); Basu and Ray (2001)]. Resultantly, policy-makers attempt to address all 
forms of child-labour through same regulatory measures such as banning the child-labour 
and incentive mechanisms. The incentive mechanism, in the prevailing policy framework 
is designed to compensate the direct and indirect costs of education with the presumption 
that these measures would essentially motivate parents to send their children to school. 
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Another dominant concept of early-age work views it as an outcome of parents’ 
selfishness. The parents have two options, either to invest in future of their children by 
equipping them with marketable skills mainly through education or to borrow from the 
future by choosing early age work for their children. The early-age work can be 
distinguished between the two kinds of work that a child can take up. First is the type of 
work that results in skill development over time such as working with motor mechanic, 
electrician, plumber, or tailor. There is generally no arrangement to impart useful 
indigenous skills in the formal educational or vocational institutions. We term 
apprenticeship career path for this kind of skill developing work in the informal sector. 
Second is the unskilled work that does not develop any specific marketable skills for 
instance, dish washing in hotels, household servants. It is a fairly justifiable assumption 
that the choice of parents to employ their children into this kind of non-skill developing 
work is the household strategy for subsistence and survival whereas the choice of an 
apprenticeship career path represents a futuristic career building strategy. 
The literature suggests that human capital development depends on the level of 
education acquired by an agent.  Empirical studies generally rely on the presumption that 
a relatively higher level of education always produces higher future earnings. Such 
studies use years of schooling as a proxy for education where each additional year of 
schooling raises the income level. This treatment of years of schooling seems less 
suitable to study the schooling choice of parents in the less developed countries. At lower 
levels of education, job and income prospects are usually lower as compared to the higher 
levels. If a household has a perception that the child is likely to attain a certain higher 
level of education where returns to education would exceed those of apprenticeship 
career path, the agent would be likely to send children to school. However, if the agent 
believes that the child would not be able to complete a higher level of education primarily 
due to his circumstances, then he may contemplate a choice between formal education 
and apprenticeship career path. This implies that the agents perceive education and skill-
oriented work as competing career paths and they take into account of the relative gain 
from the two while making their rational choices. Most of the past studies conclude that 
early-age labour is necessarily inefficient and ignore the fact that some parents consider 
early-age work as a source of human capital development. 
This paper develops a cost-benefit model that incorporates apprenticeship as an 
alternative career path to analyse its implications for the rational choice of an economic 
agent. In this context, the policy framework aiming at universal basic education cannot 
fully take into account the incentives required by the agent who chooses apprenticeship 
career path instead of formal education. The model shows that the prevailing policy 
instruments are unlikely to alter the choices of the agent and hence economies will fail to 
materialise the goal of universal education through these policy interventions. The model 
demonstrates that early-age work may not necessarily be inefficient as compared to 
different levels of education. The model suggests that in order to achieve the goal of 
universal education an overarching policy intervention is required that may educate the 
children by not compromising the skill and earnings development. Using the theoretical 
framework of the study, we conduct a simulation analysis to determine the level of 
education where benefits of education equal the benefits of apprenticeship. The analysis 
shows that at a lower level of education, the lifetime benefits of apprenticeship are higher 
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than that of formal education. For higher levels of education, the simulation analysis 
suggests that the net income earnings of education career path outstrip the earnings of 
early age work career. The simulation results are in agreement with the theoretical cost 
benefit analysis. The results imply that the goal of universal education can be achieved by 
improving quality of education as well as by banning the early age-work through 
regulatory measures.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
theoretical frameworks within which the supply side determinants of early-age work are 
analysed. The section also discusses how the issue of early-age work is placed within 
human capital formation framework and identifies the missing link in the literature. 
Section 3 highlights evidence of early-age work in less developed countries and regions. 
The proposed cost-benefit model of early-age work-education choice is presented in 
Section 4. The section also discusses the failure of existing policy of universal attainment 
of basic education. Section 5 presents the results of the simulation analysis conducted 
using available data. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and highlights the 
modifications required in the existing policy regime.  
 
2. EARLY-AGE WORK AND EDUCATION: EVIDENCE  
FROM LITERATURE 
Economics and development literature considers education as the main source of 
human capital. In his seminal work, Schultz (1961) viewed human capital as capacity to 
adapt and respond to dis-equilibrium situations. Becker (1962) asserted that human 
capital is embedded in the stock of knowledge and skills that contribute directly to 
worker’s productivity. Human capital not only affects productivity through direct effect 
on output and income but also has indirect effect on labour allocation. That is why the 
provision of basic education to children is considered a major public sector activity 
around the world. Earlier studies such as, Brown, et al. (2002) and Amin, et al. (2004) 
view the incidence of child-labour as households’ struggle to survive and to make 
livelihood. Some other studies develop models taking insights from household production 
model [see, Rosenzweig and Evanson (1977); Becker (1981); Pörtner (2001a)]. In these 
models, the household maximises utility from different factors including, number of 
children, schooling, leisure and composite consumption good that are produced using 
time endowment of family members. Households earn money either by selling goods 
they produce or by working for wages. 
Some recent studies influenced by Mincer (1974) focus on education and its 
impact on determination of wages. In these models, the household head allocates his time 
between leisure and paid work. The mother allocates her time among child-rearing and 
home production while children allocate their time endowment in leisure, education, paid 
work and household production. These models suggest that if income of husband 
increases, child education would increase and a rise in mother’s income would reduce 
size of the family since opportunity cost of child rearing activity would increase. Also, it 
may result in more investment in the child. An increase in expected wage of the child 
increases the opportunity cost of schooling and hence may decrease attainment of 
education. An increase in asset holding increases the household income and hence 
educational attainment of the child also increases. 
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The demand for education in these models is a function of household income—the 
lower is parent’s income, the higher will be the child-labour. The literature also considers 
income inequality as a source of child-labour [Ranjan (2001)]. Rogers and Swinnerton 
(2001) assume an economy that cannot support its entire population without child-labour. 
In this case, if everyone in the family enjoys equal share in family income then child-
labour will prevail. However, the high-income families would not send children to work. 
Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) highlight the role of family size on the incidence of 
child-labour and show that the age structure of children in their school going age in a 
household is important such that more siblings imply less schooling and more child-
labour. 
Economic shocks may affect parents’ choice between work and education for their 
children. Some studies have viewed child-labour as a strategy to minimise the risk of 
unpredictable changes in family income due to job loss or bad harvest [Cain and Mozumder 
(1980)]. Pörtner (2001b) suggests that parents’ motivation to see children as insurance 
increases in an economy where actuarially fair price insurance is not available. The child-
labour as a form of risk minimising insurance implies that child-labour can prevail even 
during times when household may not require income of child for subsistence in normal 
time periods. Ejrnæ and Pörtner (2002) argue that children are perceived by the household 
as a tool of insurance to reduce future uncertainty. Parents invest in the number and quality 
of their children to maximise the ‘value of family’. Land holding is the most attractive 
alternative source of earning in economies having less developed financial markets. Thus, if 
the return on education is low as compared to that of land, then the maximisation of family 
value takes the form of a large number of child farm workers. Such models highlight the 
importance of parents’ education in determining the supply of child-labour. Parents with 
higher education are expected to have higher future income and hence have less need to 
insure themselves through child-labour. Mother’s education is even more important in 
determining the educational attainments of children. These models also provide insights 
into the determinants of optimal family size which in turn determines the human capital 
development. Families lacking access to credit are more likely to withdraw children from 
school when faced with downturn in economic activity [see, Duryea (1998); Behrman, et al. 
(1999); Skoufias and Parker (2001)]. 
Theoretical models generally assume perfect land and labour markets which in 
reality is not the case. Skoufias (1995) highlights several types of land and labour market 
imperfections that may affect the optimising decision of the household. One of such 
imperfections relates to the difficulties in employing labour or leasing out land primarily 
due to principal-agent issues. This market imperfection implies that as land ownership 
increases, the tendency to employ family children increases. This relationship may be 
reversed in the case of competitive markets due to the income effect of large 
landholdings. Laitner (1997), Parsons and Goldin (1989), and Jacoby and Skoufias 
(1997) analyse how capital market inefficiencies can lead to inefficient decisions by 
parents regarding child-labour. When parents do not have access to capital markets, they 
cannot borrow against their expected future earnings when children are young in the 
current time period. In this scenario, they rely on internal resources of the family. Child-
labour today, instead of investment in human capital formation through education, is then 
a kind of borrowing from future. Because returns to extra hour of schooling are expected 
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to be higher than that of work, the decision to send child to work is inefficient in dynamic 
setting but the agent finds it optimal in the constrained situation. These studies highlight 
the importance of parents’ access to financial markets. 
Basu and Van (1998) model another structural issue of labour market to analyse 
the phenomenon of child-labour. The study proposes that the supply of child-labour is 
positive when wage of parents is less than a critical level such that once their wage 
reaches that critical level, they withdraw their children from labour force. This implies 
that the aggregate labour supply both from parents and children has a backward bending 
curve. When child-labour reaches the zero level, the supply curve becomes positively 
sloped. The above formulation implies two stable equilibriums in labour market. The 
market clearing wage would be low in the presence of child-labour. Once child-labour is 
banned, the market wage rate will rise and in effect, parents do not need to send children 
to work. Hence, the study suggests that the economy may be stuck in low-wage trap and 
recommends a complete ban on child-labour.  Basu (2000) shows that labour market with 
adult unemployment can lead to child-labour. The study analyses the effect on child-
labour of minimum-wage law that is expected to create unemployed adults and these 
parents may use the child’s earning to minimise the effects of loss in their earning. 
Becker (1974) explains child-labour in terms of parents’ selfishness and assumes that 
parents will have children only when they expect to earn positive return from them. Cigno and 
Rosati (2000) also developed a model of non-altruistic parents where each family is supposed 
to pay an amount to the parents when they become adult. The size of the payment by itself is a 
function of child’s human capital formation activities and consumption. In this setting, parents 
maximise the value of their children because it maximises their old-age returns. Basu and Ray 
(2001) asserted that child-labour phenomenon is also affected by the balance of power 
between parents such that the more the decision making power is equally distributed among 
the father and mother, the less likely is the child-labour. 
The past studies while explaining the phenomenon of child-labour, ignore the 
altruistic role of parents who choose apprenticeship career path for their children because 
the literature on human capital usually views early-age work as a source of deterioration 
of human capital. Labour can be reallocated from farming and other low skilled works to 
those nonfarm sectors where more skills are required [Fafchamps and Quisumbing 
(1999)].  Mincer (1974) proposed a methodology to estimate the returns to human capital, 
where human capital is measured through the level of education and work experience. 
The process of accumulation of human capital is used by economists to understand the 
choice between early-age work and education. The relationship between human capital 
and child-labour is usually viewed as of substitutes where child-labour decreases human 
capital by forcing the child away from education. Since returns to education are greater 
than returns to child labour, hence child-labour is dynamically inefficient. 
Baland and Robison (2000) use maximisation of family value type model to 
analyse human capital formation through education. The model has an intertemporal 
aspect in decision making where, altruistic parents, having ability to leave bequest and 
having access to capital markets invest efficiently in education to their children. The 
optimal investment decision regarding child-labour and child education in this setup is 
based on comparing the value of a child’s labour earning with the present value of 
earnings to the family due to child’s human capital acquisition in school. 
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Emerson and Shawn (2007) model the role of parents’ expectations for child-
labour, fertility and education decisions and show that there is a range of income where 
the child is expected to receive incomplete education if parents have the belief that the 
return to education is low. Because child participation in labour market reduces his ability 
to accumulate human capital, the act of sending the child to labour market fulfils the 
pessimistic expectations of the child. Contrarily, if parents expect that the return to 
education is high, then the child completes his education, hence there is no child-labour. 
The paper has the implication that onetime regulatory measures, such as banning of child-
labour and compulsory education, can take an economy out of child-labour equilibrium to 
no child-labour equilibrium because this would remove child-labour from the choice set 
of the agent. However, the model shows that the welfare effects of such a policy 
intervention depend upon the stage of development process. 
The above models make a questionable implicit assumption that returns to 
education are always greater than returns to early-age training at workplace. This is so 
because these models see education as the primary source of human capital formation 
without realising that early-age apprenticeship can also be a source of acquiring valuable 
productive skills. Also these models ignore the role of parent’s perception about the 
likelihood of their child completing some appropriate level of education (termed critical 
level in this paper). Emerson and Shawn (2007) incorporated parent’s expectations about 
returns to education for explaining the choice between education and child-labour, but it 
misses the point that expected returns to education depend upon the expected level of 
education that a child would attain. The proposed model captures this missing link of the 
literature and investigates its implications for policies aimed at universal basic education. 
 
3.  EVIDENCE FROM LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS 
Universal attainment of basic education is recognised as a desirable development goal 
included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It essentially requires that all 
children should be attending school in their school going age. Therefore, the issue of out-of-
school children has been a primary concern for policy-makers. Although, there has been an 
impressive progress towards this goal, yet fully achieving this goal in some developing 
countries remains a challenge. It requires that all the school going age children are enrolled in 
school, and schools have the capacity to retain them and their successful completion of 
primary education. In less developed countries, the enrolment is low due to insufficient public 
provision of education and quality of education is low in the schools that result in dropouts. 
Resultantly, the primary completion rates are well below 100 percent as almost 60 million 
children are out of school in their school going age worldwide as of 2012 (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 




Children Out of School 
(Million) 
Survival Rate to the Last Primary 
Grade (%) 
Male Female Male Female 
South Asia 5.5 4.8 60.0 65.0 
East Asia (Developing) 3.4 3.1 91.2 93.5 
Latin America 2.1 1.8 78.0 82.0 
World 28.4 30.9 73.5 76.1 
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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The data revealed another aspect in attainment of education in these countries that 
the boys underperform as compared to the girls. It is surprising since a typical perception 
prevails that in the less developed countries, gender discrimination in educational 
opportunities favours the boys. The girl’s education is presumably undervalued due to 
various socioeconomic factors. Paradoxically, the evidence suggests that the extent of 
education deprivation is sufficiently high among boys as compared to girls in most of the 
developing regions.  The primary completion rate is higher for girls than boys and more 
boys are out of school in their school going age. In most of the developing countries, a 
part of population or certain groups experience some sort of disadvantage in education. 
The conditions have shown slight improvement as the number of children out of 
school slashed from over a hundred million in 2000 to less than 60 million in 2015. The 
situation has improved in almost all the countries except the countries affected by 
conflicts or social upheavals, where the number of children out-of-school have increased 
over the last decade for example, Pakistan, Iraq, Haiti, Nepal etc. The UNESCO finds 
that in the developing regions, children in the poorest households are four times as likely 
to be out-of-school as those in the richest households.
11
 It is also alarming since it reflects 
social deprivation of the group as a disadvantage in education causes marginalisation and 
this deprivation effect is transmitted across generations. 
 
Fig. 1. Countries with More Than a Million Children Out of School, 2012 
 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2012). 
 
The extent of educational attainment among boys lower than girls can partly be 
explained by parents’ opportunity to engage the boys in skill developing works during 
their school going age. This skill developing work choice of the parents emanates out of 
rationality depending on their circumstance set. The global efforts based on the existing 
view towards the early age work cover the cost of education either through public 
provision and/or cash transfer. The segment of target population that does not choose 
formal education a source of skill development can be persuaded through improving the 
quality of education and skill development through it especially for those households that 
cannot afford to educate their children to higher levels due to constraints imposed by the 
 
1http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/education.shtml. 
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circumstance set. Kazi (2006) spells out the historical evolution of laws preventing child-
labour in India since 1938 and identifies the defects in the legislation and enforcement 
system, which fail to prevent child-labour especially in family-owned industries. 
However, the study does not recognise the role of apprenticeship career path in this 
failure. 
 
4.  THE MODEL OF EDUCATION-APPRENTICESHIP CHOICE 
Our model assumes that parents have two choices regarding the career path of their 
children. They can either send their child to school or to workplace for apprenticeship. 
This study follows Basu and Van (1998) with some modifications. The parents are 
assumed to be rational and altruistic and choose the best option in favour of the child. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that career path choice for the child are made by parents in 
the earlier years. Basu and Van (1998) argue that child-labour is a result of poverty that 
forces parents to send children to the work place for subsistence and survival. The 
framework of our analysis is somewhat different from Basu and Van (1998) as we 
presume that early age apprenticeship may lead to the development of human capital and 
the relevant choice facing this agent is between the early-age apprenticeship and 
education. The agent makes his choice among the two alternatives comparing their 
expected benefits and costs.  
 
4.1.  Modelling Education as Career Path 
Most of the monetary rewards of education are realised after the completion of a 
certain level of education while, the cost of the child’s education is borne by the agent 
before joining the job market. Both the cost and benefits of education depend upon the 
level of education. Higher and more professional education is usually costly with high 
earning prospects corresponding to that level of education. Suppose education starts 
paying wage wj at time period T
*
= tj where j is the number of years of schooling to 
complete that level of education. But this optimal level of education of the child is not 
certain to the parents. The educational expenditures are sort of negative wage during the 
study period as shown in Figure 2. We assume for simplicity that the cost of education is 
a constant function of the level of education. The cost of education increases as the level 
of education j increases. Let ‘j’ be the maximum level of formal education that the child 
can attain. 
Given this description, the agent forms expectations regarding the likelihood of his 
child continuing from a lower level to the higher level of education. The higher is the 
probability that the child moves to the higher education level, the higher will be the 
expected net benefit of education. The probability in turn is determined by socio-
economic vector O that captures the circumstances of the household including elements 
related to demographic features, asset holding and opportunities available to the 
household. Given that T
*
 is the time when the child enters the job market after completing 
certain education level, then Pj = P(T
*
= tj) is the probability of completing j years of 
schooling. The better are the circumstances of the household (vector O), the higher is the 
probability of T
* 
implying that the child continues to higher education level. With this 
formulation, Pj(T
*
= tj) is conditional upon O; that is     ( 
    | ). 
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Let C be the annual cost of education, Δc be constant annual increase in this annual 
cost and j be the number of years of education. A constant annual increment in cost is 
assumed to specify a linear model. The present value of expected cost of education is 
then given by the sum of the arithmetic gradient series:  
    
  
   
(   )
 
  (    )
(   ) 
 
  (     )
(   ) 
   
   (  (   )  )
(   )  
 
    
  ∑
  (  (   )  )
(   ) 
 
  
    … … … … … (1) 
The benefits of education can take two forms, direct monetary rewards and indirect 
non pecuniary benefits.  
 




(a) Direct Expected Monetary Returns are based on human capital earning 
function of Mincer (1974), where monetary returns to education occur due to productivity 
enhancement, skill development, and knowledge. Higher education and professional 
skills are associated with higher wages. Earnings associated with any education level can 
be viewed as consisting of two components: a base amount (wj) and a constant increment 
(Δwj). Figure 2 shows that if the level of education completed happens to be j1, then 






T  t2   t3 
w3 
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retirement denoted by T. On the other hand, if the child completes j2 years of schooling 
where j2>j1, then his starting wage is w2 that grows at Δw2, withw2>w1 and Δw2>Δw1. The 
starting point of wage (wj) and its growth path (Δwj) depends upon the level of education 
when the agent enters the job market. The present value of the expected life time earnings 
of education,     
 , turns out to be the present value of an arithmetic gradient series 
consisting of a base amount and a constant increment. 
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Where  ’ +m    . This reduces to:  
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)] (2) 
This equation gives the present value of direct benefits of education.  
(b) Indirect External Benefits: Indirect benefits of education can be divided into 
two components: positive social externalities and non-pecuniary personal benefits. 
Several past studies assess the direct external impact of education and find that education 
results in increased political awareness and likelihood of participation in political process 
[Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004); Dee (2004)], lower level of criminal activity 
[Lochner and Moretti (2004)], improved health of household [Currie and Moretti (2004); 
Chou, et al. (2007)], increased probability of higher education of the next generation 
[Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2003)] and higher rates of productivity of workers 
[Moretti (2004)].  Suppose b measures the indirect benefits of one year of education 
which accrue to the society in the lifetime of the child assumed to be T years. It includes 
psychological benefit associated with the tag of being ‘literate’ in society whereas 
carrying the stigma of illiterate in society gives disutility to uneducated people. This can 
also be viewed through screening argument of Stiglitz (1975), where education works as 
a signaling device for discriminating between high and low ability people. Let it be 
represented by S (a function of factors such as overall awareness about the importance of 
education in the society captured by the literacy rate). As this awareness increases in 
society, the stigma associated with illiteracy increases which leads to the higher 
magnitude of S. In this formulation, v can represent the vector of variables that affect S 
positively (for example, an increase in the literacy rate in an area where the child lives 
increases the level of stigma if there is a high tendency in the family of child to do work) 
Adding this psychological benefit with the above ones gives indirect benefits:  
    
   = (b + S)T = B 
22
 … … … … … … (3) 
Adding Equations (2) and (3) gives total benefits of education career path. 
Subtracting cost (1) from total benefits of education gives net gains of education career 
path.  
 
2Present value of these indirect benefits may be discounted at some subjective rate. 
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4.2.  Modelling Apprenticeship Career Path 
The benefit and cost corresponding to the choice of apprenticeship career path are 
given as follows.  
(a) Apprenticeship career path enables the agent to earn wage wo during training 
time which starts at time to = 0, and this wo is also expected to increase overtime, 
say, at an amount Δt until the child becomes expert in his work after t years.  
(b) The on-the-job training imparts valuable skills that eventually set his career path 
and earn him higher wage (wu) in future when the training is complete and he 
turns into an expert (expert). The earning path after becoming an expert depends 
on whether he turns into an entrepreneur by setting his own enterprise and earns 
En or remains employee and earns Em till time T. Let p be the probability that he 
would become an entrepreneur and earn Δen growth rate in wu and (1 – p) be the 
probability that he remains employee and obtains Δem growth rate in wage wu till 
time T. Intuitively, Δen would be greater than Δem. For simplicity, we assume that 
wt, wu and their increments Δt, Δen and Δem  are applicable to all apprenticeship 
professions that impart valuable skills. The probability of becoming an 
entrepreneur is dependent upon socio-economic opportunities (q) available to 
the agent. This earning schedule of apprenticeship career path is shown in 
Figure 3. The earning path in the case of establishing an enterprise is higher than 
in the case where an expert remains employee in the informal sector. 
 





The present value of expected lifetime earning in apprenticeship career path is 
given as follows:  
PVA = PV of earning during training time 
       + p(PV of earning as entrepreneur after training) 
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This is given by the sum of present values of arithmetic gradient series: 
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4.3.  The Decision Criterion 
The choice to send the child to school depends upon the above two PV expressions 
given in Equations (2) and (4). The objective is to examine how the factors that determine 
the choice of education career path play a role in schooling decision of the child. We 
analyse net benefits of both career paths for that critical education level (j
*
) that equates 
the present values of the two career paths. Note that j
*
 is expected to lie between 0 and 
the highest level of education, i.e. 0 <j
*
< ’. Writing the direct benefits of education for j
*
 
level of education and solving the total benefits of education with those of apprenticeship 
career we obtain, 
    
  (  )
    
   … … … … … … … (5) 

















        
33 … … … … … (6) 
Equation (6) gives the critical level of education (j
*
) which equates the present 
values of the expected net benefits of education and informal apprenticeship career paths. 
The critical level of education (j
*
) can also be interpreted as perceived pay-back period of 
the agent, that is how long will it take for return on education to become equal to the 
return yielded by apprenticeship career path. In other words, it is the number of years of 
education that the agent believes should leave him indifferent about the two career paths 
such that j
*
 is the breakeven point that would equate the net benefits of education with 
those of apprenticeship. Therefore, j
*
can be seen as appropriate wait-time of the agent to 
enter the job market. This interpretation of j
*
 has two implications for rational decision 
making.  
(1) It is evident from the solution that higher is the j* required to equate PVs of 
both career paths, the more is the number of years a child must continue to 
study to out-perform the expected earnings of apprenticeship career. Also, the 
higher is the j*, the higher is the initial wealth/income an agent must be 
endowed with to finance the cost of education. As the pay-back period of the 
agent increases, his willingness to go for education career would decline.  
(2) Choosing the education career path is not necessarily superior for all levels of 
educational attainments. It depends upon the level of education (j) for which 
we are comparing the two choices. For all j<j
*
, expected returns on education 
are less than those in apprenticeship career, hence choosing education would 
be inefficient for such an agent at these lower education levels. This important 
 
3See Appendix for solution. 
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result shows why education policies that seek to ‘ensure minimum education 
for all children’ may fail under certain conditions (such as adverse poverty and 
family education background etc.). If education policies target a minimum 
education level jt that is less than j
*
, then agent would not be motivated. This is 
shown in detail in Section 4.5 below.  
 
4.4.  Some Comparative Statics of the Model 
Equation (6) can be used to analyse the response of j
*
 to a set of exogenous and 
policy variables. We examine some of these here.  
(1) Cost of Education (C): Differentiating (6) with respect to C gives:  
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     … … … (7) 
The above sign holds because    (therefore
 
 




When the annual price of education increases, it decreases the net benefits of education 
and j
*
would decrease in the mind of agent. This means that parents’ willingness to spare 
the child for schooling would decrease. Thus, (7) says that the critical level of education 
(j
*
) in the economy is required to decrease for motivating the agent to choose education 
career path after a rise in the cost of education. But if j
*
 does not change in the economy 
or the agent believes that it has not changed; then he would be discouraged to send the 
child to school after increase in C. Because j
* 
is determined by the interaction of several 
factors and market forces in the economy, it can’t be altered (say by government 
intervention) in response to an increase in price of education. Hence, we have the 
proposition:  
Proposition 1: Everything held constant, an increase in the price of education would 
decrease the number of years spent on education by the child. 
It is interesting to note that the rate at which this perceived j
*
 changes due to a change in 
C depends not merely on the growth rate of the cost of education (  ) but on several 
other variables.  
   
   (                 ) … … … … … (8) 
The policy implication of the above result is that the cost of education should be 
subsidised because that would increase the likelihood of the child going to school by 
increasing the net-benefits of education and hence increasing the wait-time of the agent. 
It can be shown that  
   
   
    which implies that annual increment in the cost of 
education also decreases j*.  
(2) Probability of Becoming Entrepreneur (p): If the agent has a higher probability that 
the child would turn into an entrepreneur in apprenticeship career, then the pay-back period 
(length of time for which agent is required to spare child for education) would increase:  
 
   
  
 












(       )(   )
        
 
)      … … … … (9) 
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because        and γ< α. If parents have higher expectations that the child would be 
able to become an entrepreneur, then their willingness to send the child to school would 
decrease as their wait-time decreases. This is because with higher p, the PV of net 
benefits of apprenticeship increases.  
Proposition 2: If the agent has a higher likelihood of his child becoming entrepreneur 
in the apprenticeship career, his willingness to send the child for education would 
decrease.  
Some more interesting results can also be derived using Equation (6). We move 
onto analyse the policy of minimum basic education using insights of the above model.  
 
4.5.  Failure of Minimum Basic Education Policies 
We now discuss the implications of a policy that aims at some minimum education 
level jT. Figure 4 plots the PV of benefits from both career paths. The dotted line is 
cumulative present value of benefits from apprenticeship career from time zero to T.  It is 
positively sloped because wt as well as wu> 0 and is plotted convex because we have 
assumed Δc such that the rate of increase in wage is greater than r (the discount rate). 
Solid curves plot cumulative present values of net-benefits from education path at 
different levels of education. The curve labeled PV
1
 is PV of education net benefits for 
education level 1 (say primary). The curve is drawn below throughout PVA curve 
indicating the fact that PV of life-time net-benefits of education are less than PVA at this 
education level. This curve shifts up as education level increases (say to education level 
2) and at j
*





) PVE of education net benefits exceeds that of PVA.  
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Figure 5 plots PV of education benefits for j
*
 level along with PVA. The thinner 
lines are depicting the components of net benefits of education (i.e. PV of direct and 
indirect benefits and cost). Consider an agent who is poor and has low expectations of his 
child reaching j
*
 education level. He would send his child to school only if he expects the 
attainment of j
*
 level of education. In other words, his demand for education would be 
zero below j
*
 level. Suppose that the policy maker is targeting universal attainment of 
some education level jt, say primary, such that jt<j
*
. Clearly, this agent would not be 
motivated to send child to school even if explicit cost ab0jt is waved and additional 
amount 0cjt is given as conditional cash transfer to compensate implicit cost of sending 
the child to school till jt period. Note that the implicit cost of j
*
 education level is given 
by area below PVA curve (dT0) while explicit cost would be above cost line up to j
*
. This 
agent would be motivated for child schooling only if the subsidy guarantees j
*
 (say 
graduation) level of education and not jt. The farther is j
*
 from jt level, the more is 
likelihood that the policy would fail in motivating this agent. 
 
Fig.  5. Earning Path in Case of Education Career Choice 
 
 
It is important to emphasise the reason of failure of this policy design for this 
specific agent. The policy-maker targets education level jt (say primary) mainly due to 
external considerations of education (that it makes children better citizens, inculcates 
basic skills etc.) but the agent views this policy on the basis of the effects of this jt 
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 of the agent, this is tantamount to leaving the poverty ridden agent far behind in 
his efforts to reach j
*
. Hence, he would refuse to move along with this policy-maker to 
the point jt.  
The solution to this policy failure requires that jt should be set as close as possible 
to j
*
 to motivate these agents for participating in such minimum education programs. In 
other words, the minimum is required to be as high as possible. The alternative method of 
making this policy more effective is to facilitate these children to acquire human capital 
through both sources simultaneously. This requires changing the existing institutional 
arrangements that can convert the ‘dichotomy’ between the two sources of acquiring 
human capital into ‘complementarity’.  
 
5.  SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
A comprehensive empirical analysis of the propositions developed in the previous 
section essentially requires data on the variables used in the theoretical framework. 
Unfortunately, data on these variables do not exist for any country. Alternatively, we 
carry out simulation analysis of final equations of the model using appropriate prior 
information and estimates from the literature. Table 2 gives the description of the 
parameters used in the simulation analysis. The estimates of starting wages for different 
education levels (Wj) are obtained from Labour Force Survey of Pakistan 2014-15 by 
using following criteria.  
 Employed workers with j years of education are selected. 
 Among the selected workers, those with minimum age are identified (e.g., 16 
years of age for 8 years of education). 
 The average wage of these workers is treated as starting wage after j years of 
education. 
The growth rate of Wj is approximated by real per capita growth rate of 2014-15 
with some adjustment for higher j levels. Similarly, cost of education and its increment 
are approximated keeping in view the expenditures in public sector education institutions. 
The estimates of data used for simulating equation for apprenticeship career are mostly 
based on the Survey conducted in three major cities of Pakistan namely Karachi, Lahore 
and Rawalpindi/Islamabad by Siddique and Ahmad (2018).  
Table 3 gives the results of simulation. It shows how the lifetime net benefits of 
education (NBE) respond to different levels of education (j) acquired by the worker. The 
benefits of apprenticeship (BA) are assumed to be independent of education level in this 
calculation. The results clearly show that the net benefits of education are less than the 
benefits of apprenticeship until the higher secondary level of education (equivalent to 
Grade 12) is obtained by the individual. However, for all higher levels of education, the 
net monetary benefits of education are higher than the same for apprenticeship career 
path. Figure 6 plots the same information and shows that the net benefits of education get 
closer to the benefits of apprenticeship as j increases and these become equal at 
approximately 12 years of education. In other words, the present value of benefits from 
both career path become equal if a child achieves 12 years of education. Our results are 
based on two caveats. First, we assume for simplicity that there are no benefits other than 
the  wage  earned by the worker. Second, the benefits of education are assumed neutral to  
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Table 2 
Definition of Variables Used in the Simulation Analysis 
Notations Description Based on Value Used  
r  Discount rate 




Number of years of education after which one 
joins job market 
Years of schooling Years from 8 to 16 
P or Pj Probability of completing  j years of education Intuitive guess values  
Pj(8) = 0.95 
Pj(10) = 0.85 
Pj(12) = 0.75 
Pj(14) = 0.65 
Pj(16) = 0.55 
So School starting age Age 5 Years for class one 
Wj or Wj* 
Starting wage rate after j years of education 
level 
Average Wages of 
employed workers 
(Labour Force Survey, 
2014-15) 
W(8) = 8000 
W(10) = 11000 
W(12) = 14500 
W(14) = 20000 
W(16) = 24000 
ΔWj Annual growth rate of Wj 
Equal to real per capita 
growth 
@4% for Grade-8-12 and 
@6% for Grade-13 
onwards 
ΔC Annual growth rate of cost of education C  @3% annually 
T Retirement time (60 years of age) Age 60 Years 
T - (j + So) Work time after completing j years of education 
Productive age of a 
person 
Calculated as required 
Wo or Wt 
Starting wage of trainee when he starts 
apprenticeship at t = 0  
Siddique and Ahmad 
(2018) 
Rs 150 daily 
ΔWo Annual growth rate of Wo 
Lump sum annual 
increase 
Rs 500 
Wu Starting wage of Ustad (trainer) 
Siddique and Ahmad 
(2018) 
Rs 14,000 
ΔWu or Δen Annual growth rate of Wu 
Lump sum annual 
increase 
Rs 2,000 
Wem Starting wage of trainee who remains employee 
Siddique and Ahmad 
(2018) 
Rs 14,000 
ΔWem Annual growth rate of Wem 




Probability of becoming trainer (Ustad) after 
training 
Siddique and Ahmad 
(2018) 
0.75 
1 – p 
Probability of remaining employee after 
training 




Starting age of training in Apprenticeship career 
path 
Age of trainee 10 Years 
t  
Years it takes to complete training in the 
apprenticeship career 
Average training time 4 Years 
T - (AC + t) 
Working years after the completion of t years of 
training  
Productive age of a 
person 
Calculated as required 
 
Table 3 
Results of Simulation Analysis 
(Million Rupees) 
Years of Education Net Benefits of Education Benefits of Apprenticeship  
 
Difference 
8 3.87 5.12 –1.25 
10 4.59 5.12 –0.53 
12 5.15 5.12 0.03 
14 6.48 5.12 1.36 
16 7.13 5.12 2.01 
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the quality of education. Both these assumptions are quite strong but are opted due to data 
constraints.   Therefore, j
*
 = 12 is the level of education that approximately equalised the 
benefits of two alternative career paths (at least in the absence of stringent regulation 
banning the early age work choices). The results suggest that the policy of targeting 10 
years of schooling is expected to fail as an incentivising tool. It essentially requires some 
sanctions for the parents who opt early age work for their children. 
 
Fig.  6. Simulation Results of NPV of Education and Apprenticeship Career Paths 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Child-labour is major cause of nonattainment of universal primary education 
among school age children. The conventional wisdom views early age work largely as an 
outcome of poverty whereby the agent seeks to ensure survival. The issue of out-of-
school children signifies the important role of factors affecting both the demand for and 
supply of education. On the one hand, it implies the failure of the government to supply 
quality education. On the other hand, the benevolent parents may find it worthwhile to 
equip the child with some marketable skills for ensuring his future earnings.  This view 
about the prevalence of child-labour cannot satisfactorily explain high rates of 
educational deprivation in Pakistan. A more relevant descriptive model is developed in 
this paper that can address this paradoxical evidence.  
This paper highlights that early-age work can be a source of human capital 
accumulation when the agent opts it as an apprenticeship career path, mostly in the 
informal sector of the economy. There is also a general belief that child-labour 
necessarily compromises the development of human capital. The model takes into 


















Years of Education 
NBE
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early-age work may not necessarily be inefficient when compared with different levels of 
education. The rational choice of parents depends upon the expected returns from 
education and apprenticeship career paths. If parents have low expectations regarding 
their child reaching the critical level of education where the expected benefits from 
education outweigh those from apprenticeship career, they are unlikely to send the child 
to school. This suggests that policies that aim at universal basic education may fail to 
achieve the desired outcomes.  
The paper carries out the simulation analysis to validate the theoretical model by 
employing the most relevant available data and compare the benefits in the form of 
prospective income earned in the two career paths. It finds that at a lower level of 
education the net benefits of education are lower than the benefits of apprenticeship 
career path; however, as education level rise above the Grade-12, the net benefits of 
education are better than those of early age-work for all higher levels of education. The 
theoretical and empirical analyses clearly indicate the reasons for low educational 
attainments of education in poor households. The policy of universal education can be 
achieved by minimising the number of out-of-school children and drop outs. Moreover, 
the economy relies on the informal sector for a large number of economic activities and 
services for which no formal institutions exist and informal sector attracts resource poor 
households for career choices of their children.    
To increase the effectiveness of policies, the targeted education level should be set 
as close as possible to a level whereby marginalised segments of the society can acquire 
education along with their apprenticeship career path. A limitation of the study is that it 
assumes a community where parents have discretion to choose between education and 
early-age work. The study offers a theoretical framework that needs to be empirically 
tested by using data of individuals choosing both the alternative career paths. This should 
be an interesting future undertaking for researchers especially in those countries where 
child-labour is a chronic issue.   
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Taking logarithm on both sides of (c), the equation can be written as follows:  
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Simplifying using logarithm expansion ln (1 + x) = x for x< 1:  
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